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The article focuses on the significance and relevance of victim’s consent in sexual 
offenses cases. The case-law of national legal systems as well as of international judicial 
bodies demonstrates that consent is a conditio sine qua non for qualifying an act as 
a sexual offense. However, the recent examples of criminal cases raised from national 
and international jurisprudence allow authors to conclude that the non-consensual 
character of sexual acts is frequently complicated to prove in due to some peculiarities of 
the sexual offenses per se. This paper analyses the modern technique of sexual offenses 
criminalization which can be characterized by one of two possible approaches: first, the 
presumption of the alleged victim’s consent to sexual intercourse or, on the contrary, 
second, the presumption of the lack of thereof. Despite the fact that the second approach 
seems to be more favorable for alleged survivors, the implementation of this approach 
entails a number of difficulties. The main one is the hypothetical conflict with the meta-
presumption of criminal procedure (i.e. the presumption of innocence). In the paper this 
contradiction is analyzed from the perspective of the legislation and jurisprudence of 
different jurisdictions, as well as the practice of international judicial bodies (European 
Court of Human Rights, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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Introduction
the eminent French philosopher and historian of the 20th century michel Foucault 
wrote:
the disappearance of public executions marks therefore the decline of the 
spectacle; but it also marks a slackening of the hold on the body.1
thus he explained the shift of the paradigm of punishment in the 18th – and 19th – 
century, which was manifested in the reduction of the number of death sentences 
imposed, as well as the deformation of the theatricality of their execution. indeed, 
the State is gradually losing its dominance over the human body. this statement, 
certainly true to this day, is now filled with different meanings. the government 
is losing not only direct physical domination over the human body; it is losing its 
power over what is hidden from prying eyes – the intimate side of human life. the 
government is no longer sovereign in the private life of the individual: it has stopped, 
or must stop deciding what one should do and who should be the one to do so as 
part of their sexual life.
1  michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir : Naissance de la prison 16 (1975).
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although there is no single definition of “sexual crime,”2,3 it is obvious that, in 
the most basic way, it can be represented as follows: sexual intercourse (in various 
forms) performed without the consent of the victim. Consequently, lack of consent is 
a constitutional element of sexual offences. in other words, establishing the absence 
of consent of the alleged victim is a key phase in the process of characterising the act 
as a sexual offence.4 this shows the peculiarity of sexual offences, since in all other 
cases the lack of consent of the victim is irrelevant to the existence of a crime.5 they 
are related like yin and yang: where there is a sexual offence, there is no consent, 
and conversely, where there is consent, there is no sexual offence.6
this claim has perhaps become an axiom. in the course of the evolution of the 
consciousness of human society, consent has become such a significant category 
in the area of sexual relations that, hypothetically, even a person engaged in 
permanent prostitution may become, for instance, a victim of rape. until recently 
(1980–1990) it was not so obvious: it was stubbornly believed that a person engaged 
2  in the absence of a well-established term to describe a set of crimes of a sexual nature, the term “sexual 
offences” will be used, as well as “sex crimes” due to their compactness. it should be borne in mind that 
“sex crimes” per se are not related to gender in any way. the term “sex crimes” is saturated with gender 
characteristics of the crimes in question, which is fundamentally incorrect, since, in principle, a person 
of any gender can become the victim of any “sexual offence,” regardless of how the legislator formulates 
the object of the crime. the term “sexual crimes,” in turn, seems applicable in the article as in russian the 
collocations “sex crime,” “crime sexuel,” etc., used in the analyzed foreign publications and court decisions 
in foreign languages, can be translated into russian both as “sexual crimes,” and as “sex crimes.”
3  this is not only about the national legislation of a particular state, but also international law. the latter 
has increasingly sought to develop a synthesized definition of the notion “sexual crime.” For example, 
Women’s initiatives for Gender Justice, a non-profit organization concerned with the lack of a clear 
definition of sexual violence in the text of the rome Statute of the international Criminal Court, launched 
the “Call it What it is” campaign, the main objective of which is to develop a missing definition involving 
survivors of sexual violence. these victims were asked to answer the question of what sexual violence 
was to them. as a result of the work, a civil society declaration on sexual violence was prepared in 
September 2019. However, only time will tell how successful these intellectual attempts to define 
sexual violence have been.
4  Bernard Pellegrini, Grandeurs et apories de la notion de « dignité de la personne humaine » comme catégorie 
juridique, 1 La revue lacanienne 118, 120 (2008); Catherine Le magueresse, Viol et consentement en 
droit pénal français. Réflexions à partir du droit pénal canadien, 34 archives de politique criminelle 223, 
227 (2012).
5  nathan Brett, Sexual Offenses and Consent, 11(1) Can. J. L. Jur. 69, 70 (1998).
6  in russian legislation, rape (pt. 1 of art. 131 of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation), as well as 
violent actions of Sexual Character (pt. 1 of art. 132 of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation) are 
referred to cases of private-public prosecution (pt. 3 of art. 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). this 
implies, as the general rule, that the prosecution of these crimes begins upon them being reported by 
the victim. on this basis, some authors conclude that the absence of a victim’s statement means his 
or her consent to the violence committed against him or her and, as a result, the absence of a crime. 
See, e.g., Сидоренко Э.Л. Квалификация преступлений против личности, совершенных с согласия 
потерпевшего // Мировой судья. 2016. № 9. С. 27–34 [elina L. Sidorenko, Qualification of Crimes 
Against the Person Committed with the Consent of the Victim, 9 Justice of the Peace 27 (2016)]. However, 
the present study does not raise the issue of establishing a relationship between the victim’s claim of 
sexual violence, his or her acceptance of the violence and the criminal nature of the latter.
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in prostitution and receiving income from that activity could not be raped; they are 
always expressing consent to sexual intercourse, with anyone, anywhere.7 one British 
law as early as the 18th century recognised that a person engaged in prostitution 
could be a victim of rape.8 However, it was necessary to wait two centuries for this 
legislative provision to begin to be implemented in practice.9
1. “Consent” Is Conditio Sine Qua Non of Sexual Relations
if before the sexual life of a person was under the control of the government and 
protected for the sake of maintaining public morals and ethics,10 these perceptions 
have now changed. the right to have sex (as some new legal value11) is believed 
to be derived from the right to do with one’s body as one pleases, which is in turn 
a constituent part of law on personal integrity. applying the logical law of transitivity, 
it can be concluded that the right to have sex henceforth refers to the privacy of 
any person. if this is the case, the only case in which a State, through its bodies and 
officials, may interfere in this area is coercion to engage in sexual relationships (that 
is, sexual relations without the consent of at least one of their participants).12 Let us 
trace the evolution of these views using the example of the practice of the european 
Court of Human rights (hereinafter referred to as the european Court, eCtHr or 
Strasbourg Court), where it is particularly visible.
in the Dudgeon v. United Kingdom13 case (1981), the applicant, a British subject 
residing in northern ireland, believed that the offences against the Person act of 1861, 
which provides for criminal penalties up to life imprisonment for “unnatural” sexual 
relations (even between adults who have expressed their mutual consent), violated his 
right to privacy guaranteed by article 8 of the european Convention for the Protection 
of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 
european Convention or eCHr).14 Furthermore, as a homosexual, he regarded himself 
as a victim of a violation of article 14 of the european Convention (prohibition of 
7  Barbara Sullivan, Rape, Prostitution and Consent, 40(2) J. Criminol. 127, 128 (2007).
8  terese Henning & Simon Bronitt, Rape Victims on Trial: Regulating the Use and Abuse of Sexual History 
Evidence in Balancing the Scales: Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture 76 (Patricia easteal ed., 1998).
9  For more information, see Susan S.m. edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law (1981).
10  Jean-Pierre marguénaud, Liberté sexuelle et droit de disposer de son corps, 49 droits 19, 26 (2009).
11  alberto Cadoppi, Les infractions sexuelles en Italie. Problèmes et perspectives, 34 archives de politique 
criminelle 167, 171 (2012).
12  michela marzano, Le mythe du consentement. Lorsque la liberté sexuelle devient une norme de servitude 
volontaire, 48 droits 109, 110 (2008); daniel Borrillo, La liberté érotique et l’exception sexuelle in La liberté 
sexuelle 45 (daniel Borrillo & danièle Lochak eds., 2005).
13  eCHr, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 22 october 1981, Series a no. 45.
14  Id. para. 37.
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discrimination) for the reason that homosexuals in northern ireland are oppressed in 
comparison with homosexuals in england and Wales, and Scotland, where homosexual 
relations had been decriminalised by the 1967 and 1980 acts respectively.15
in this case, the european Court found a violation of article 8 of the european 
Convention.16 nevertheless, in the course of its reasoning, the eCtHr reflected the 
views of european society in the 1980s about the possibility of legislative regulation 
of sexual relations. it agreed that “some degree of regulation of male homosexual 
conduct” could be justified in a democratic society, in order “to preserve public 
order and decency [and] to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious.”17 
in other words, the Strasbourg Court found that a lawmaker’s restriction of the right 
to privacy in the area of sexual relations may have legitimate purposes provided for 
in article 8-2 of the eCHr, namely: “the protection of morals in the sense of moral 
standards obtaining in northern ireland.”18
therefore, the european Court recognised in its decision that the right to have 
sex is a constituent element of the right to privacy. However, the government, in 
order to protect any interests (above all, public morality and ethics) may limit the 
right to respect for privacy (in the aspect of sexual relations), resorting even to the 
ultima ratio of its capabilities – the tools of criminal justice.
the next eCtHr case that deserves our attention when considering the evolution of 
views on the concept of individual sexual freedom is the Norris v. Ireland19 case (1988). 
the applicant, an english lecturer and campaigner for the rights of homosexuals in 
ireland, argued that irish legislation of 1860–1880 (still in force at the time of the case 
before the Strasbourg Court), according to which homosexual relations between 
consenting men who have reached the age of majority are crimes, violates their right 
to respect for privacy. realising that he is homosexual and aware of the existence 
of this legislation, the applicant feels “deep depression and loneliness” because any 
implementation of his orientation would be penalised by criminal means. to avoid an 
internal crisis, a psychiatrist even advised him to leave irish territory. if he was treated 
with understanding by the irish police, he began to be attacked by ordinary people 
and bystanders after a public interview.20 unlike the previous case, the applicant in the 
case had not been subjected to any criminal prosecution by the State,21 but this did 
not prevent the Strasbourg Court from acknowledging his complaint acceptable.
15 eCHr, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, paras. 17–18, 65.
16  Id. para. 63.
17  Id. para. 49.
18  Id. para. 46.
19  eCHr, Norris v. Ireland, 26 october 1988, Series a no. 142.
20  Id. para. 10.
21  Id. para. 38.
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the eCtHr reiterated its position that restricting sexual intercourse by 
criminalising certain types of intercourse may have a legitimate goal of preserving 
morals and ethics.22 at the same time, the european Court pointed out, largely 
reiterating its position in the Dudgeon case: given that society has become more 
tolerant of homosexual orientation and that representatives of the State did not 
provide evidence of the abrupt failure of the irish society to accept sexual relations 
between consenting adults of homosexual orientation, criminalising such relations 
is not necessary in a democratic society.23
Having analysed the practice of the european Court of the 1980s on the right 
of persons to have sex at their own will, we can conclude that during this period of 
time the eCtHr still allowed for the possibility of the State to restrict the freedom of 
everyone to lead the sexual life they want to lead, but has already considered in the 
vast majority of cases such limitations as unnecessary in a democratic society.
the situation changed dramatically in the late 1990s: the practice of the Stras-
bourg Court took a step (perhaps even a few) back. in the Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. 
United Kingdom24 case (1997), three applicants believed that they were victims of 
a violation by the British State of article 8 of the european Convention guaranteeing 
the right to privacy.25 the fact is that video recordings of practices of sadomasochistic 
content (“[t]he acts consisted in the main of maltreatment of the genitalia (with, 
for example, hot wax, sandpaper, fish hooks and needles) and ritualistic beatings 
either with the assailant’s bare hands or a variation of implements, including stinging 
nettles, spiked belts and a cat-o’-nine tails were obtained by the police. there were 
instances of branding and infliction of injuries which is related in the flow of blood and 
which left scarring”26), featuring the applicants as well as other men. the applicants 
were charged with causing harm to various parts of the bodies of certain persons by 
the prosecutor’s office. Furthermore, it is important to note that these persons did 
not on their initiative complain to the police; they were satisfied with their current 
situations. the applicants objected to the charge, because the sadomasochism in 
which they took part was carried out by mutual consent between all persons and 
“behind closed doors.” in addition, inflicting pain had the sole purpose of bringing 
sexual pleasure.27 ultimately, the applicants were found guilty of the acts referred to 
by the prosecutor’s office.
22  eCHr, Norris v. Ireland, para. 40.
23  Id. paras. 33–34.
24  eCHr, Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, 19 February 1997, reports of Judgments and 
decisions 1997-i.
25  Id. para. 35.
26  Id. para. 8.
27  Id.
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the eCtHr acknowledged in the given case that British law, which had allowed 
the conviction of the applicants and thereby restricted their right to respect for 
privacy,28 pursued legitimate purposes, as provided for in article 8-2 of the eCHr, 
the preservation of health and morality.29 the european Court noted that one of the 
roles assumed by any State was
to seek to regulate, through the operation of the criminal law, activities 
which involve the infliction of physical harm. this [was] so whether the 
activities in question occur in the course of sexual conduct or otherwise.30
at the same time, the extent of damage to which a national legislator may be 
treated indifferently should be determined by the legislator itself.31 So far, it seems 
that the eCtHr has written nothing supernatural in the abovementioned decisions. 
But there’s more ahead. unlike the previous cases (Dudgeon, Norris), in which the 
european Court found that government’s interference in the regulation of sexual 
relations is not necessary in a democratic society, the case in question differs in the 
fact that real bodily harm was inflicted on some persons in the course of sexual 
practices of a certain nature.32 Given the nature, the amount of damage suffered 
by a number of persons in the process of sadomasochistic practices in the course 
of over 10 years, the Strasbourg Court recognised the actions of the government 
to condemn the applicants conventional in the sense that they are necessary in 
a democratic society.33
therefore, the european Court, without denying that the sexual life of a person 
is an integral part of his or her privacy, imposed limits on the exercise of freedom 
in sexual intercourse. a person may, with the consent of others, do whatever he 
pleases in the area of sexual life, so long as his or her actions do not cause real 
harm (in particular, bodily harm). and what constitutes “real harm” and its intensity, 
which can no longer be ignored, is decided by the legislator itself. Such a position 
cannot be called logical: on the one hand, the government cannot interfere in the 
intimate area of the individual as long as everything happens “behind closed doors,” 
voluntarily, with consent; on the other hand, the government may still impose some 
28  in fairness, it is worth noting that the eCtHr was uncertain whether the activities that the applicants had 
engaged in, given the number of people who took part, could relate to the privacy of the applicants or 
not. However, since neither party challenged this aspect, the Strasbourg Court felt it inappropriate to 
begin doing so on its own initiative (eCHr, Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, para. 36).
29  Id. para. 35.
30  Id. para. 43.
31  Id. para. 44.
32  Id. para. 45.
33  Id. para. 49.
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restrictions on consent to sexual intercourse. But what the restrictions will be and in 
what cases they will be applied will be decided by the government itself. Wouldn’t 
the “inconsistency” in the position of the Strasbourg Court lead to the government 
eventually gaining full domination over the sexual life of a person?
this problem goes back to the legal issue of the victim’s consent to harm being 
caused to him or her. the russian legal doctrine has strengthened the view that there 
are a number of conditions under which the person who caused harm in connection 
with the consent of the victim may be exempted from criminal responsibility: first, 
the admissibility of victim’s consent, secondly, the capacity of the victim’s consent; 
thirdly, the voluntariness of victim’s consent.34 Admissibility of consent means that the 
legal regime established in a State allows for the possibility to make use of a good 
by causing harm, to which the person agrees. For example, a person’s consent to the 
taking of a life by another person has no legal effect. this explains the legal prohibition 
of euthanasia (art. 45 of the Federal Law of 21 november 2011 no. 323-FZ “on Basics 
of Health Protection of the Citizens in the russian Federation”). researchers relate the 
capacity of consent to the psychological and social willingness to realise the nature and 
consequences of harming legally protected values. this criterion for various crimes may 
be based on the capacity of a person, reaching a certain age, his or her legal capacity, 
etc. the legal doctrine35 considers the voluntariness of consent as the absence of vices 
of consent (such vices of consent are sometimes not obvious from the outside).
a. Krasikov, one of the most famous russian legal scholars who studied the 
legal value of a victim’s consent to causing harm and discussed the importance of 
mechanisms of reconciliation with the victim and the victim’s consent stated that
the desire of the victim to reconcile with the perpetrator is essential for the 
exemption of the perpetrator from criminal responsibility only in cases where 
criminal infringement shall be carried out on rights and freedoms which are 
only in his possession or, conditionally speaking, in his property.36
34  in addition, the russian doctrine also identifies other requirements for the expression of consent 
(timeliness, specificity, availability), which will be discussed below (infra, ii). For these requirements, 
see more Газданова Е.К. Согласие потерпевшего в уголовном праве: понятие, характеристика, 
значение: автореф. дис. … канд. юрид. наук [elena K. Gazdanova, Consent of the Victim in Criminal Law: 
Concept, Characteristic, Meaning, extended abstract of Phd thesis] (moscow, 2011); Лопашенко Д.В. 
Соотношение частного и публичного в уголовном праве: дис. … канд. юрид. наук [daria v. 
Lopashenko, The ratio of Private and Public in Criminal Law, Phd thesis] (moscow, 2018).
35  Сидоренко Э.Л. Презумпция согласия потерпевшего в российском уголовном праве // Юридическая 
техника. Ежегодник. № 4 [elina L. Sidorenko, Presumption of Consent of the Victim in Criminal Law in 
Legal Drafting, Yearbook. No. 4] 503, 503–504 (vladimir m. Baranov ed., n. novgorod, 2010).
36  Красиков А.Н. Примирение с потерпевшим и согласие потерпевшего – «частный сектор» 
в публичном уголовном праве // Известия высших учебных заведений. Правоведение. 1998. 
№ 1(220). С. 179 [arkadii n. Krasikov, Reconciliation with the Victim and Consent of the Victim – “Private 
Sector” in Public Criminal Law, 1(220) Proceedings of Higher educational institutions. Jurisprudence 
178, 179 (1998)].
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Similarly, it is possible to consent to causing harm only in respect to the rights that 
a person actually possesses. in most jurisdictions around the world, economic rights 
and a number of civil rights are considered freely alienated; inalienable (with rare 
exceptions of several european States decriminalising euthanasia) is the right to life; 
with regard to health rights, there are various legislative provisions concerning the 
legal effect of consent to causing harm.37 as noted above, concerning sexual offences, 
the category of consent is of particular importance, and it distinguishes sexual offences 
from other crimes. as noted above, in the context of sexual offences, the category of 
consent is of particular importance, and it differs sexual offences from other crimes. at 
a certain stage of the development of society, it was through the category of consent 
that the State had been “removed” from the sexual life of a person.
in sexual relations there is no room for State regulations and, accordingly, 
responsibility for free and voluntary contacts, so long as they involve individuals 
who are capable (due to age and mental state)38 of giving valid consent to enter into 
sexual contacts. the State can only invade a person’s sexual life when it is marred by 
violence, that is, a lack of consent.
Legal doctrine states that harm to a victim’s health (not related to his or her sexual 
rights) must meet additional criteria in order to exclude criminal liability. For instance, 
37  in particular, the only example of grounds established by russian substantive criminal law for 
exemption from criminal liability in connection with the consent of the victim to causing harm is 
the rule established in the note to article 122 of the uK rF. this rule applies if a person placed in 
danger of infection or infected with Hiv has been timely warned about the presence of this disease 
by the infected person and voluntarily agreed to commit acts that posed a risk of infection. in the 
legislation of foreign countries there are different approaches to the legal effect of consent of persons 
to cause harm to their health (see more Капинус О.С. Согласие жертвы на причинение вреда // 
Современные уголовное право в России и за рубежом: некоторые проблемы ответственности: 
сборник статей [oksana S. Kapinus, Consent of the Victim to Causing Harm in Modern Criminal Law in 
Russia and Abroad: Some Problems of Responsibility: Collection of Articles] 50 (moscow, 2008).
38  the problem of qualification of sexual offences against persons below the age specified in the law 
(referred to in the literature as the “age of sexual consent”), as well as against persons who are incapable 
of understanding the meaning of their actions due to the mental state, is not included in the topic 
of our essay, since the “consent” of these persons to enter into sexual relations does not, according 
to the general rule, have legal effect in the vast majority of modern “ordre public” (for the “age of 
consent” see, e.g., Чугунов А.А., Морозова А.А. Особенности квалификации насильственных действий 
сексуального характера // Современное право. 2016. № 6. С. 96–99 [alexander a. Chugunov & 
alexandra a. morozova, Peculiarities of Qualification of Violent Acts of Sexual Nature, 6 modern Law 96, 
96–99 (2016)]; matthew Waites, Inventing a ‘Lesbian Age of Consent’? The History of the Minimum Age 
for Sex Between Women in the UK, 11(3) Social & Legal Studies 323 (2002)). thus, article 222-22-1 of the 
Criminal Code of France (as amended by 3 august 2018) establishes: “When violent acts of a sexual 
nature in one form or another are committed against a minor under the age of 15, moral coercion 
or deceit is manifested always in the abuse of the vulnerability of a victim who, because of their age, 
cannot fully understand the nature of the actions taken against them.” in other words, in this case, 
the juvenile age of the victim is itself a defect of will. Cf. note to article 131 of the uK rF recognizing 
minors under the age of 12 who are always in a helpless state as unable to understand the character 
and the effect of the actions taken against them.
But in cases where the consent of such persons is still relevant (for example, in situations of voluntary 
sexual contact with other minors) everything stated in the article on consent applies to these situations 
as well.
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if without such harm it would be impossible to save human life or health. Similarly, 
it may be a required motive and purpose useful for public wellbeing.39 it seems 
that sexual freedom, as a value protected by criminal law, does not require such 
reservations and is, in this sense, a more stringent legal category: having reached the 
“age of consent” defined by law, a mentally healthy individual has the right to decide 
and enjoy his or her sexual freedom at his or her own discretion. therefore, we shall 
agree with those authors who have noted that the disposition of sexual freedom by 
a person who is able (due to age and mental state) to be aware of the character and 
the effects of the actions taken against him or her should not be limited.40
Further development of the practice of the european Court has turned towards 
the recognition of the determining legal effect of the victim’s consent, the absence 
of which predetermines the possibility of the State to interfere in the area of sexual 
relations. evidence of this is the revolutionary decision of the eCtHr in the K.A., A.D. v. 
Belgium41 case (2005). two applicants were convicted of beating and mutilating 
the wife of the first applicant during sadomasochism practices.42 the domestic 
jurisdictions of Belgium, which examined the applicants’ case, noted that despite 
the woman pleading for mercy, the applicants continued to commit painful acts 
of sadistic sexual nature against her.43 the domestic jurisdictions stated that sexual 
freedom protected by article 8 of the eCHr cannot be unlimited: its limit is the 
dignity of the personality of other individuals.44 the applicants believed, inter alia, 
that their criminal conviction was contrary to article 8 of the eCHr, which protects 
everyone’s right to privacy.45
the eCtHr recalled that the concept of “private life” is broad and includes 
elements such as gender, sexual orientation and a sex life.46 So there is nothing 
surprising that the conviction of the applicants could be considered and regarded 
39  although there is also an opposite view, which is that the presence of purpose of socially beneficial 
harm to life and health does not neutralize the criminal law-effect of a victim’s consent in all cases. 
See, e.g., Соктоев З.В., Ринчинова А.Р. Согласие лица на причинение его жизни и здоровью // 
Вестник Университета имени О.Е. Кутафина (МГЮА). 2018. № 12. С. 121–129 [Zorikto B. Soktoev & 
anna r. rinchinova, Consent of a Person to Causing Harm to His Life and Health, 12 Courier of Kutafin 
moscow State Law university (mSaL) 121, 121–129 (2018)].
40  See, e.g., Орешкина Т.Ю. Обстоятельства, исключающие преступность деяния: дискуссионные 
вопросы общего характера // Уголовное право. 2016. № 4. С. 66–76 [tatiana iu. oreshkina, The 
System of Circumstances Excluding Criminality of an Act: Disputable General Issues, 4 Criminal Law 66, 
66–76 (2016)].
41  eCHr, K.A., A.D. v. Belgium, nos. 42758/98 & 45558/99, 17 February 2005.
42  Id. para. 11.
43  Id. paras. 13, 15.
44  Id. para. 23.
45  Id. para. 62.
46  Id. para. 79.
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as an interference with their privacy.47 the criminal nature of battery and injury is 
prescribed by law and certainly pursues the legitimate purposes provided for in 
article 8-2 of the eCHr (protection of the rights and freedoms of others, health, 
public safety, prevention of disorder and crimes, etc.).48 Was the conviction of the 
applicants in the case at hand a measure necessary in a democratic society? the right 
to respect private life guaranteed by article 8 of the european Convention protects 
the right to the personal development of everyone and involves the possibility to 
establish and maintain relations with others, including in the intimate area of life.49 
therefore, in principle, criminal law can invade the area of sexual life based on the 
mutual consent of persons only if there are “extremely serious reasons”50 for this. the 
K.A., A.D. v. Belgium case is characterised by the presence of a reason of this nature: 
in the situation under consideration, the applicants continued to carry out sadistic 
actions against the victim, ignoring her requests to stop it.51 in other words, the acts 
of sexual nature carried out by the applicants had gone from the realm of mutual 
consent into the realm of coercion. that is exactly why their criminal conviction was 
recognised by the Strasbourg Court as a measure proportional to the aims pursued, 
which were necessary in a democratic society.
thus, in this case, the eCtHr moved away from the “automatism” of restricting 
sexual freedom that it demonstrated in the 1997 case of Laskey Jaggard and Brown. 
indeed, the Strasbourg Court developed a criterion for possible State interference 
in the sexual life of the individual – the presence of “extremely serious reasons” – 
and linked it to the lack of consent of the victim. the eCtHr recognised the actions 
of the Belgian State as appropriate to the eCHr not because sadomasochism, given 
its cruelty and traumatising nature, should in principle be prohibited for the sake of 
ensuring public morality, health and rights of others. that’s not the point at all. the 
Strasbourg Court supported the Belgian authorities because they had penalised the 
applicants’ actions which had been committed after repeated pleas for mercy by 
the victim, the wife of the first applicant. that is, the applicants continued to carry 
out their actions while realising that the victim was no longer willing to tolerate 
these actions: after asking for mercy several times, she clearly withdrew her initially 
given consent. and again we return to the category of consent in the sexual life of 
a person. if sexual relations occur in the absence of the consent of at least one of 
the persons, the State can and should intervene in it, because that is a violation of 
the sexual freedom of the individual.
47  eCHr, K.A., A.D. v. Belgium, para. 78.
48  Id. paras. 80, 81.
49  Id. para. 83.
50  Id. para. 84.
51  Id. para. 85.
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the analysis of the eCtHr jurisprudence leads to conclusions about a gradual 
increase of the importance of consent in the area of sexual life. it is “consent” that 
became the criterion by which it is possible to distinguish criminal from non-criminal.52 
therefore, the further parts of our research will focus on different approaches to 
include the category of consent in the concept of sexual offences.
2. “Consent” and the Criminalisation of Sexual Offences
Consent as a key category of sexual offences separates criminal sexual behaviour 
from non-criminal behaviour. the presence of consent is the “point of no return” at 
which law enforcement bodies must decide whether or not it is possible to prosecute 
for particular conduct. as a part of the sexual offences concept, the establishment 
of consent can be done through two opposite approaches. one is based on the 
presumption of consent of the alleged victim. in other words, the victim is presumed to 
have given consent to engage in sexual relations until vices of his or her consent are 
proven (i.e. consent was given under duress or in a helpless state, etc.), in which even 
the formal existence of consent cannot be considered as such. another approach is 
based on the presumption of a lack of consent of the alleged victim. it is presumed that 
the victim did not agree to have sexual intercourse, which is why it is the accused 
person who must demonstrate how he or she obtained the consent of the victim. at 
the same time, the proven presence of vices of consent automatically eliminates the 
possibility of obtaining consent. the difference between the approaches is apparent: 
in the case of the presumption of consent, the dispute is based on the victim’s vices 
of consent to engage in sexual intercourse, in the case of the presumption of a lack of 
consent, the emphasis is transferred from vices of consent to the direct existence of 
the intended victim’s consent. in fact, even if the vices of consent are not manifested 
outside, it does not mean the existence of the consent of the intended victim (for 
example, economic or kinship dependence is not always visible to the prying eye). it 
turns out that the absence of visible vices of the victim’s consent and the existence 
of her or his consent are not equal categories.
the evaluation of these two approaches should also take into account the fact 
that presumptions are important not only in substantive and procedural law, but 
also in creating an image of an average man,53 which often escapes from the view of 
lawyers who underestimate the imagery of law. indeed, in the area of substantive law, 
the existence of, for example, the presumption of innocence involves the assumption 
52  at the same time, the category of consent cannot be considered as absolute. as some authors rightly 
point out, a person engaged in prostitution is “consenting” to engage in sexual intercourse with 
her or his client not because she or he really wants to, but because it is necessary to make money 
(marzano 2008, at 117).
53  rémy Libchaber, Les présomptions, entre fonction probatoire et rôle substantial, 11 droit & Philosophie 
129, 136–140 (2019).
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of the law-abiding nature of each person, and the existence of a presumption of good 
faith – the assumption of reasonable use of one’s civil rights, of avoiding the abuse 
of them. it turns out that the right is “designed” initially for the honest man.
applying this reasoning to presumptions of consent and a lack thereof, it can be 
concluded that the significance of these presumptions is not limited to their direct 
influence on criminal law (as part of the concept of sexual offences) and criminal 
proceedings (concerning the shifting of the burden of proof ). the presumption of 
consent creates an image of an average person who, by default, easily engages in 
sexual intercourse with others, thereby limiting their inviolability. on the contrary, 
the presumption of a lack of consent gives an image of a person who places above 
all their personality and the inviolability of their material shell – the body.
Let us briefly refer to the examples from the practice of international criminal 
justice, which demonstrates the existence of two different approaches to the 
criminalisation of sexual offences, so that our thought does not remain so hypothetical 
and theorised. thus, in the famous case of the international Criminal tribunal for the 
former yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as the iCty), The Prosecutor v. Furundžija54 
(1998), trial Chamber i defined as constitutional elements of rape the following:
(i) sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) on the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion 
or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.55
as a consequence, in the absence of the use of force, threats, coercion, the crime 
of rape cannot be constituted because it is obvious that elements (i) and (ii) are 
cumulative. in other words, if there is no vice of consent in the form of violence, 
threats, coercion – there is no rape. this is the example of the presumption of consent 
approach, which considers that the victim consents until defects of her or his consent 
can be proved.
another approach based on the presumption of absence of consent was reflected 
in the decision of the international tribunal for rwanda (hereinafter referred to 
as the iCtr) in The Prosecutor v. Akayesu56 (1998) case. in this judgement, the iCtr 
defined rape as
a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes rape, is 
54  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, it-95-17/1-t, Judgement, trial Chamber i, 10 december 1998.
55  Id. para. 185.
56  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, iCtr-94-6-t, Judgement, trial Chamber i, 2 September 1998.
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considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person 
under circumstances which are coercive.57
defining the crime of rape in this case, the iCtr sought to avoid the mechanical 
enumeration of the vices of consent (violence or threats) and refused to enumerate 
those parts of the body that should be involved.58 a similar definition of rape was 
given in the decision of the trial Chamber of the iCtr in The Prosecutor v. Musema59 
case (2000). in the Akayesu and Musema cases, it was determined that rape was any 
act “of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive,”60 irrespective of the manifested vices of consent.
Further perception of the second approach can be found in the iCty judgment 
in The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.61 case (2001). the judges (and it is interesting to 
note that presiding over the Furundžija and Kunarac trials was the same judge 
from Zambia) decided to clarify or, as it is stated62 by some authors, to “expand the 
definition of rape” done in the Furundžija case. the trial Chamber, deciding to retain 
the first part of the definition of rape from the Furundžija case, amended the second 
part as follows:
(ii) sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent 
for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s 
free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.63
therefore, both iCty (in 2001) and iCtr judges believe that rape should not only 
be penetration of a sexual nature committed in various forms, with the use of force, 
threats, coercion (vices of consent), but also in the absence of the latter. that is, there 
57  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, para. 598.
58  the judges of the trial Chamber in the Akayesu case explicitly stated that they considered rape 
as a form of aggression the basic elements of which cannot be reflected in the legal rule by the 
enumeration of used body parts or objects (Id. para. 597).
59  iCtr, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, iCtr-96-13-t, Judgement and Sentence, trial Chamber, 27 Janu-
ary 2000, para. 965.
60  iCtr, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, iCtr-96-4-t, Judgement, trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, 
para. 688; iCtr, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, iCtr-96-13-t, Judgement and Sentence, trial Chamber, 
27 January 2000, para. 965.
61  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., it-96-23-t & it-96-23/1-t, Judgement, trial Chamber, 
22 February 2001.
62  Gloria Gagiolli, Les violences sexuelles dans les conflits armés : une violation du droit international 
humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l’homme, 96 revue internationale de la Croix-rouge, 
Sélection française, débat humanitaire : droit, politiques, action, violences sexuelles dans les conflits 
armés 85, 90 (2014).
63  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., para. 460.
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may not be vices of consent, but this does not mean that the consent of the victim 
in such a case appears on its own. its presence is to be proved.
in the Kunarac case, it was stressed that the issue of voluntariness of sexual contact 
should be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the commission 
crimes, and coercion should not be reduced merely to the use of violence or threat of 
its use.64 at the same time, the existence of vices of consent in the form of violence, 
threats of violence, in principle, precludes the possibility of proving the existence 
of consent,65 as we casually mentioned earlier. in other words, under the second 
approach, a lack of consent is not rigidly tied to the presence of vices of consent.
on the one hand, this approach was presented by researchers and practitioners as 
progressive and appropriate because it solves some issues of proving the constitutive 
elements of sexual offences. in situations of armed conflict, systematic attacks against 
civilians carried out in some situations as part of a large-scale plan or policy, the 
balance in interpersonal relations is levelled. in such situations (armed conflict or 
systematic attacks on civilians) victims are so disadvantaged that their vulnerability 
often does not require violence or threats to overcome the reluctance of victims to 
engage in sexual contact. on the other hand, those have convicted of rape interpreted 
in this way indicated that the victim had to resist in order to make it clear to the alleged 
perpetrator that sexual intercourse was undesirable. in 2002 the iCty rejected the 
argument of the convicted that only the victim’s resistance could provide adequate 
notice to the perpetrator of the undesirability of his sexual advances on the basis that 
“it is contrary to the law66 and is absurd on the facts.”67 But in fact, the question of how 
consent or a lack thereof should be expressed for engaging in sexual intercourse has 
not lost its relevance. this will be discussed in more detail below. 
Prima facie it is possible to give the following characteristics for the described 
approaches. On the one hand, if the right to have voluntary sexual intercourse is to 
be elevated to the rank of absolute, the second approach based on the presumption 
of a lack of consent is more appropriate. this is because it allows all cases of sexual 
acts where the consent of the victim is absent to be considered sexual offences, 
not only those where vices of her or his consent are present. that is, the protection 
of sexual freedom is comprehensive, it is not limited to cases of vices of consent. 
On the other hand, the approach based on the presumption of a lack of consent is 
questionable from the point of view of the rights of the accused.
64  iCty, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., para. 440.
65  Id. paras. 458–459.
66  in considering whether the victim needs to express resistance to the rapist in order for the act to 
be classified as rape, the iCty turns to the legislation of various jurisdictions: California, new Jersey, 
district of Columbia and the Federal republic of Germany (iCty, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac 
et al., it-96-23/1-a, Judgement, appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, paras. 130–133).
67  Id. para. 128.
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it seems that any evidential presumptions are a technique designed to reverse 
the burden of proof. So does the presumption of a lack of consent requiring the 
accused person to prove the way of obtaining the victim’s consent to engage in 
sexual intercourse. this presumption de facto leads to the shifting of the burden of 
proof: it turns out that the accused partially has to prove his or her innocence.
a number of recent events have influenced social consciousness and led it to 
turn its attention to the problem of sexual violence in modern society. in addition, 
the existence of two approaches in international criminal law that give different 
definitions of sexual offences has led to a debate on the applicability of the definitions 
based on presumptions of a lack of consent within national legal systems. Some 
researchers68 supported the presumption of a lack of consent approach as more 
progressive and to be enshrined at the national level. advocates of the contrary point 
of view emphasise in particular that the essence and direction of criminalisation 
of rape in international criminal law and national legislation differ: “in this national 
context, there is no attack against an entire population” and “the issue is typically 
the interactions between two individual people who are treated in law as equally 
autonomous individuals.”69
Both in the real actions of national legislators and in the proposals expressed 
de lege ferenda it is possible to observe the manifestations of the global trend of 
a shift from the paradigm of consent to the paradigm of a lack of consent of victims 
of sexual offences (I). at the same time, it should be recognised that the problem of 
relationship between the presumptions of consent or a lack thereof and the meta-
presumption of criminal proceedings – the presumption of innocence – remains 
largely unresolved. in other words, the transition from the presumption of consent 
to the presumption of a lack of consent has not only a positive effect (II). the russian 
legislator is still inactive in the area of reforming crimes against sexual freedom 
and the sexual integrity of a person. Such situation contributes to an in-depth 
analysis on what paradigm of criminalising sexual violence is dominant in russian 
law and whether manifestations of another paradigm are observed. it is thought 
that this analysis will answer the question of whether it will be rational to transfer 
russian legislation from the track of the presumption of consent to the track of the 
presumption of a lack of consent.
2.1. Change of Presumption: The “Silence of the Lambs” or the “Roar of the 
Lions”?
the scandal around the Hollywood director Harvey Weinstein, which unfolded 
at the end of 2017 led to the emergence of the #metoo campaign mainly in the 
68  Le magueresse 2012, at 225–226; melanie randall, Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and “Ideal Victims”: 
Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming, 22(2) Can. J. Women L. 397, 418 (2010).
69  alison Cole, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi: The New Definition for Prosecuting Rape Under International Law, 
8(1/2) int’l Crim. L. rev. 55, 75 (2008).
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english-language segment of the internet and its analogues (#balancetonporc in 
France, #янебоюсьсказать in russia and ukraine). this also led to awarding in 2018 
the nobel Peace Prize to denis mukvedzh and nadia murad who combatted rape 
during armed conflicts. all these events widely reported in the press are united 
by the fact that they are the result of the “liberation” of victims of sexual violence 
from the oppression of silence. in this sense, indeed, “the silence of the lambs” has 
become “the roar of the lions”! it turns out that one who was considered to be giving 
consent (because of her or his silence), can be, in fact, non-consenting at all. and it is 
recognised thanks to the fact that the former “consenting” began to speak. But these 
events are also united by the fact that they could not but influence the criminal law 
policy of some States in the field of sexual offences.
a clear example of this is France.70 in the French Parliament at the moment many 
legislative projects (projets) and proposals (propositions) have been introduced. one 
of the main aims of these projects and proposals is to tighten accountability for 
committing sexual offences. Some projects and proposals become laws. the adopted 
law of 3 august 2018 on tightening the fight against sexual and sexist violence71 
increased, in particular, the statute of limitations on criminal prosecution for sexual 
crimes up to 30 years if committed against minors. this statute of limitations should 
be counted from the age of majority of the victim.
a similar influence (albeit in a more modest volume) can be traced in some other 
states: ukraine, Sweden and iceland.
ukrainian Law of 11 January 2019 no. 2227-viii “on amendments to the Criminal 
and Criminal Procedure Codes of ukraine for the Purpose of implementing the 
Provisions of the european Council Convention on Preventing and Combating 
violence against Women and domestic violence Which Came into Force”72 expands 
70  See, e.g., Proposition de loi tendant à rendre imprescriptibles les crimes et les délits sexuels sur mineurs du 
14 septembre 2017, Proposition de loi tendant à porter à trente ans le délai de prescription applicable aux 
crimes sexuels sur des mineurs du 25 avril 2017, Proposition de loi d’orientation et de programming pour 
une meilleure protection des mineurs victimes d’infractions sexuelles du 12 février 2018, Proposition de 
loi visant à renforcer la définition des agressions sexuelles et du viol commis sur des mineur-e-s de moins 
de 15 ans du 30 octobre 2017, Proposition de loi pour une meilleure protection des mineur.e.s victimes 
de viol et des autres agressions sexuelles du 26 octobre 2017, Proposition de loi tendant à renforcer la 
protection des mineurs contre les agressions sexuelles du 17 octobre 2017, Proposition de loi visant 
à requalifier les faits d’atteintes sexuelles en agressions sexuelles en agressions sexuelles ou viol du 18 jan- 
vier 2018, Proposition de loi visant à créer une présomption irréfragable d’absence de sentement pour 
les mineurs de moins de quinze ans ayant eu des relations sexuelles du 07 décembre 2017, Proposition 
de loi relative à la qualification de viols sur mineur en vue de fixer l’âge minimum de présomption du 
consentement sexuel à quinze du ans 12 octobre 2017, Sénat, un cite au service des citoyens (Jul. 2, 
2021), available at https://www.senat.fr/ and at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/.
71  Loi du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences sexuelles et sexistes (Jul. 2, 2021), available 
at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
72  Закон Украïни «Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів 
України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству 
стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами» (Jul. 2, 2021), available 
at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2227-19.
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the legal definition of the crime of rape. now it includes any act of a sexual nature 
committed without the voluntary consent of the victim. Proving vices of consent 
are no longer mandatory for the legal qualification of an act as rape. Similarly in 
Sweden,73 named the “rape capital of the world,”74 as well as in iceland75 where the 
laws entered into force define the crime of rape through a lack of consent rather 
than through the use of violence, as was previously the case.
moving now to a more technical level, it may be noted that the impact of these 
events on criminal law policy is expressed in a shifting of the paradigm used in the 
criminalisation of sexual offences (in particular, rape76). On the one hand, the system of 
sexual offences is something more or less well-established in the national legislation of 
various States. What is obvious, for example, is the fact that rape is criminalised one way 
or another (with a greater or lesser degree of gender focus in the legal definition) in all 
countries. in some countries (for example, in russia now and in the united Kingdom 
until 199477) rape is considered exclusively as a crime against females, since the victims 
could only be women. in France, the gender focus of rape was abandoned as early 
as 1980, but at the mental level rape still continues to be a crime against females.78 
it is worth noting that it remains in question (even in european States), for example, 
whether rape committed by one spouse in respect of the other can be criminalised.79 
Furthermore, it is impossible to avoid the influence of the cultural aspect of a certain 
State on the range of sexual offences specified in criminal legislation. in countries where 
customary law continues to operate (afghanistan, iran), the criminalisation of spousal 
73  Brottsbalk (1962:700) (BrB), 6 kap. om sexualbrott (Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://www.lagen.nu/ 
1962:700#K6.
74  Björn Borschos & david Shannon, Indikatorer på sexualbrottsutvecklingen 2005–2017, Rapport 
2019:5 [Rapport on Phenomenon of Sexual Offenses 2005–2017, Rapport 2019:5] (2019) (Jul. 2, 2021), 
available at https://www.bra.se/download/18.62c6cfa2166eca5d70e1919f/1565079287510/2019_
5_indikatorer_%20pa_sexualbrottsutvecklingen_2005_2017.pdf.
75  almenn hegningarlög, nr. 19, 12 febrúar 1940 [General Criminal Code no. 19 of 12 February 1940] 
(Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://www.althingi.is/lagas/nuna/1940019.html.
76  Without denying the existence of countless forms in which sexual violence can appear, from rape and 
sexual slavery to sexual harassment, we will use the term “rape” as general for the sake of simplicity 
(organisation mondiale de santé, rapport mondial sur la violence et la santé (2002), at 165 (Jul. 2, 
2021), available at https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_
fr.pdf ). the term “rape” will be used as a synonym for the terms: “sexual violence,” “sexual crimes,” 
“sexual offences.” this will not affect the essence in any way, because the idea still remains the same, 
we shall consider sexual offences in general and rape as a particular case.
77  Jennifer temkin, Rape and Law Reform in Rape: An Historical and Cultural Enquiry 55 (Sylvana tomaselli & 
roy Porter eds., 1986).
78  See interesting reasoning about this: audrey darsonville, Le surinvestissement législatif en matière 
d’infractions sexuelles, 34 archives de politique criminelle 31 (2012).
79  on this issue, there is the practice of the european Court which dealt with this problem in the 1990s through 
the prism of article 7 of the eCHr (nullum crimen sine lege): eCHr, C.R. v. United Kingdom, 22 november 
1995, Series a no. 335-C; eCHr, S.W. v. United Kingdom, 22 november 1995, Series a no. 335-B.
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rape is not yet possible in principle.80 On the other hand, the fundamental discrepancy 
between national legal systems lies not even in the definition of sexual offences, but 
also in the degree of importance of the victim’s consent to sexual intercourse for the 
qualification of an act as rape. there are two approaches (two paradigms) to this effect. 
they have already been mentioned above: now, to see global trends, there is a need 
to focus on this issue in more detailed comparative remarks.
The first of the paradigms based on the presumption of consent has historically 
emerged earlier. it is generally believed that the presumption of consent is a “child” 
of the 19th century. until the mid-19th century, for example, english judges believed 
that rape was solely sexual intercourse with a woman against her will, committed 
using force, fear or deception.81 in France in 1857, the judges of the Court of Cassation 
stated in one of their decisions:
the crime of rape consists of abusing a person against his or her will, when 
the lack of consent results from physical or moral violence exerted against him 
or her, or when it results from any other means of coercion or deception to 
achieve, outside the will of the victim, the goal of the subject of the action.82
From these provisions it is noticeable that in the 19th century the fact of rape 
could be stated only if violence, threats, and deception were used to force sexual 
intercourse. in other words, rape occurred only in situations where there were 
manifested vices of the victim’s consent.
it is therefore possible to conclude that the presumption of consent of the 
victim implies the definition of rape as a sexual act committed with coercion of the 
victim (or, more broadly, through the vices of his or her consent determined by each 
national legislator in its own way, which, inter alia, may be caused by threat, violence, 
deception, misleading, helpless state, etc.). in other words, the victim is presumed to 
be consenting to sexual intercourse until an apparent vice of his consent identified 
as a constitutional element of actus reus of rape is proven. Countries where the 19th-
century approach continues to operate are: russia83 and, perhaps surprisingly, certain 
european countries, except Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, iceland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden.84 For example, under russian law rape is defined as a
80  Pejman Pourzand, La violence sexuelle : cas symptomatique de l’anachronisme des perceptions juridiques 
afghane et iranienne, 34 archives de politique criminelle 241 (2012).
81  Peter rook & robert Ward, Sexual Offences: Law and Practice (2004); Lillian artz & dee Smythe, Should 
We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008).
82  Cour de cassation, Chambre Criminelle, arrêt du 25 juin 1857 (quoted in Le magueresse 2012, at 227).
83  in russia, there is perhaps only one presumption of the lack of consent (see the note to article 131 
of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation on sexual acts with minors under 12 years of age). So 
it is currently impossible to say that this paradigm is dominant in russian law.
84  amnesty international, europe: right to Be Free From rape – overview of Legislation and State of Play 
in europe and international Human rights Standards (2018), at 9 (Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/9452/2018/en/.
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sexual intercourse with the use of violence or the threat of its use to the 
victim or other persons or with the use of the helpless condition of the victim 
[pt. 1 of art. 131 of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation].
the French legislator, in turn, defines rape as follows:
every act of sexual penetration, whatever nature it may be, committed 
with the use of violence, coercion, threats or deception [art. 222-23 of the 
French Criminal Code].
these are two typical examples of the way to define the crime of rape using the 
presumption of consent. no violence, threats, coercion, deception – no rape.
However, it remains undeniable that, in case when the Prosecution failed to prove 
such circumstances, the crime of rape will not be found even if the victim claims that 
he or she did not consent to having sexual intercourse. in other words, if the victim 
engaged in sexual intercourse in the absence of consent, these circumstances did 
not constitute the crime of rape unless there were vices of consent.85
in modern legal literature, it is noted that in order to prove the existence of 
elements of the crime of rape, the Prosecution has, in fact, a “double burden of 
proof.”86 indeed, it must prove the presence of sexual intercourse, as well as other 
elements (use of violence, threat, deception, the helpless state of the victim...) 
indicating the lack of victim’s consent. it is difficult to agree with such allegations: 
the Prosecution always has a single burden of proof that cannot be divided, halved 
or fragmented. this burden is to prove all necessary elements of the offence (both 
actus reus and mens rea, as well as the contextual element if it is about international 
criminal law). in the end, no one would suggest, for example, that the burden of proof 
for a Prosecution in murder cases is doubled by virtue of its need to prove, firstly, the 
fact of a forcible death, and secondly, the accused person’s intent to cause death.
The second paradigm (or approach) based on the presumption of a lack of consent 
assumes that rape should be defined as any sexual intercourse committed without 
the voluntary consent of the victim (even in the absence of explicit vices of his or 
her consent). after all, the fact is that if force, threats or deception were not used 
in relation to the victim, then this does not always mean having his or her true 
consent to engage in sexual intercourse. it is possible to imagine a lot of different 
types of dependence of the victim on a rapist (material or family dependence, for 
example), in which the latter does not even have to force the victim to engage in 
sexual intercourse. How can the Prosecution prove vices of consent in situations 
85  in France, for example, in addition to the direct prescriptions of the law, this approach is supported 
by the judges of the Court of Cassation (François desprez, Preuve et conviction du juge en matière 
d’agressions sexuelles, 34 archives de politique criminelle 45, 50 (2012)).
86  Id. at 50, 64.
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where only the rapist’s appearance scares the victim so much that he or she loses 
any capacity for resistance? in this case, sexual intercourse will take place, but at the 
same time, the rapist has no need to do anything violent in order to push the victim 
to “agree.” How can the Prosecution establish the existence of vices of consent of the 
victim in this case if they are not objectified in the material world in any way (except 
the appearance of the rapist)? it is possible, of course, to imagine surreal images 
of the criminal trial in such a case: the Prosecution argues, insisting on the victim’s 
subjective feelings, that the alleged rapist inflicts fear with the mere appearance, 
and the defence, on the contrary, calls for a common sense and objective appraisal 
of the appearance of the accused, who is similar to a kind of prince from disney fairy 
tales. What is the court to do?
of course, the most controversial aspect of this approach is the fact that a person 
accused of committing rape must prove that he or she had made steps to obtain and, 
most importantly, had obtained the victim’s consent to engage in sexual intercourse. 
the relations between the presumption of a lack of consent and the presumption of 
innocence will be discussed in detail below, but looking ahead, it should be noted 
that the doctrine proposes a way out of the delicate situation of the discrepancy 
between two evidentiary presumptions. therefore, it is argued that
the law may establish the Prosecution’s duty to provide additional 
evidence of physical resistance, the words pronounced and other elements 
of the victim’s behaviour which indicated the latter’s lack of consent.87
Such a decision can hardly be considered effective in the sense that the victim may 
continue to claim that he or she did not agree, but psychologically could not resist 
actively. to require the presence of manifested signs of the victim’s resistance means to 
move back from the presumption of a lack of consent to the presumption of consent.
the presumption of a lack of the victim’s consent operates in many countries 
around the world, which demonstrates that this presumption is not linked to particular 
legal culture. among such countries we can enumerate is, first of all, Canada. in 1992 
in the legislation of this country a law labelled the “no means no” law by doctrine88 
was adopted. Canada is perhaps the flagship in this area, as the Canadian legislator 
has succeeded in carrying out a real revolution of the transition from presumption 
of consent to presumption of a lack of consent. this is probably because Canada is 
not a member of a regional (inter-american) human rights protection system. the 
87  artz & Smythe 2008, at 28.
88  Le magueresse 2012, at 231. in fact, the name in question became particularly correct in characterizing 
the 1992 reform following the 1999 ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in the R. v. Ewanchuk case, 
which will further be discussed (elaine Craig, Ten Years After ewanchuk The Art of Seduction Is Alive and 
Well: An Examination of the Mistaken Belief in Consent Defence, 13(3) Can. Crim. L rev. (2009) (Jul. 2, 
2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1492625).
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Supreme Court of Canada believes that consent should not be obtained for having 
sexual intercourse in general, but at each stage of sexual activity it is to be obtained 
newly. in R. c. J.A. (2011) the Court established that a woman had expressed consent 
to her partner to have sexual intercourse with him during which he was to choke her. 
the moment she passed out, the partner continued to commit acts of a sexual nature 
with her. the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the victim’s consent to sexual 
intercourse during suffocation was not (and could not be) obtained. the victim’s 
consent after the moment she passed out was not (and could not be) obtained, that 
is why the partner’s actions were of a coercive nature.89
namibia and South africa are african States which currently recognise 
a presumption of a lack of consent.90 in the legislation of european states such as 
the united Kingdom, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, iceland, Luxembourg and Sweden,91 
the presumption of a lack of consent has recently been introduced.
Let us give some examples of how the presumption of consent is reflected in 
terms of domestic law. the British Sexual offences act of 2003 (Sec. 1 (1)) defines 
rape as follows:
a person (a) commits an offence if – (a) he intentionally penetrates the 
vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) B does not consent 
to the penetration, and (c) a does not reasonably believe that B consents.92
this definition is clearly based on the presumption of a lack of consent: rape as 
a sexual act committed without the consent of victim is not solely confined to cases 
of vices of his or her consent. However, the presumption of a lack of consent can be 
expressed “veiled,” less explicitly.
Such an example exists at the international level. Let us refer to rule 70 (“Principles 
of evidence in Cases of Sexual violence”) of the rules of Procedure and evidence of 
the international Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the iCC). Paragraph (c) 
of this rule states:
Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance 
by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence.
the quoted rule can be interpreted so that even if the manifested vices of consent 
are absent and the victim does not resist, it is not yet a reason to claim that she has 
89  R. c. J.A., 2011 C.S.C. 28 (27 mai 2011) (Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://juricaf.org/arret/Canada-
CourSuPreme-20110527-2011CSC28.
90  artz & Smythe 2008, at 33–35, 46–47.
91  amnesty international, supra note 84, at 9.
92  Sexual offences act 2003 (Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/
part/1/crossheading/rape/2004-05-01.
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agreed to sexual intercourse. in the case of vices of consent, however, the consent 
of the victim cannot be established in principle, as stated in paragraph (a) of the 
rule in question:
Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive 
environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine 
consent.
in summary, we note that the rules of Procedure and evidence of the iCC insist 
that in the case of vices of consent there can be no voluntary consent, and in the 
absence of vices of consent such consent must not be assumed.
it is worth noting that the modern trend (or what we call “the shift of criminal 
policy paradigm”) is the “migration” (or attempts to migrate) of some jurisdictions 
from the group that recognises the first approach to supporters of the second 
approach. this was pointed out in 2003 by the european Court of Human rights in 
its fundamental decision on rape in the M.C. v. Bulgaria case. Particularly, the eCtHr 
noted that the States’ rejection of the presumption of consent and the requirement 
of using violence, threats or deception to establish the crime of rape is “a clear trend”93 
observed in european states. this opinion of the Strasbourg Court was taken into 
account by the drafters of the 2011 istanbul Council of europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating violence against Women and domestic violence. article 
36-2 of this Convention provides:
Consent [to engage in sexual intercourse] must be given voluntarily as 
the result of the person’s free will assessed in the context of surrounding 
circumstances.
the explanatory report to the Convention states that, given the requirements of the 
eCtHr, States should move away from the narrow definition of rape. the requirement 
to apply physical violence in any case entails the impunity of sexual assault offenders.94 
in each specific situation it is necessary to establish the consent of the alleged victim 
to engage in sexual intercourse and it is necessary to do so in accordance with all the 
circumstances, rather than based on the findings on stereotypes and myths of the 
behaviour of victims of sexual violence in such situations.95
93  eCHr, M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, eCHr 2003-Xii, para. 156.
94  rapport explicatif de la Convention du Conseil de l’europe sur la prévention et la lutte contre la 
violence à l’égard des femmes et la violence domestique, istanbul, 11.v.2011, para. 191 (Jul. 2, 2021), 
available at https://rm.coe.int/16800d383a.
95  Id. para. 192.
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in addition, the u.n. Committee on the elimination of discrimination against 
Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) has already had the opportunity 
to recommend that a number of countries change the first approach with the 
presumption of consent to the second with the presumption of a lack of consent, 
since it is in compliance with current international requirements (in particular the 
provisions of the 2011 istanbul Convention): romania, Sweden, Portugal, Croatia, 
Finland, Hungary and norway.96 thus, in its concluding observations on the combined 
eighth and ninth periodic reports of Portugal of 24 november 2015, the Committee 
pointed to the State’s responsibilities
to take the necessary measures to adequately address sexual violence in 
its laws and policies and ensure that all forms of non-consensual sexual acts 
are included in the definition of rape under the Penal Code.97
the Committee recommended the Portuguese legislator change the track from 
the narrow definition of the crime of rape, which necessarily requires the presence 
of vices of consent. more directly, the Committee expressed its wish to Hungary in 
the concluding observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports 
of this State of 26 march 2013. the Committee stressed the need to
amend the Criminal Code [of Hungary] to ensure that rape is defined on 
the basis of a lack of voluntary consent of the victim.98
moving from the presumption of consent to the presumption of a lack of 
consent is not as straightforward as it could hypothetically be considered. Both the 
presumption of consent and the presumption of a lack thereof are characterised by 
advantages and disadvantages which cannot be ignored. therefore, when assessing 
the perspectives of such shifting, it is not necessary to bypass the analysis of the 
positive and negative features of both presumptions.
2.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Moving from the Presumption of 
Consent to the Presumption of a Lack of Consent
Let’s start with the advantages, among which at least two, albeit very impressive 
ones, can be named.
96  See about this amnesty international, supra note 84, at 8.
97  Concluding observations of the u.n. Committee on the elimination of discrimination against Women 
on the combined seventh to ninth periodic reports of Portugal of 24 november 2015, para. 25(a) (Jul. 2, 
2021), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en /hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx.
98  Concluding observations of the u.n. Committee on the elimination of discrimination against Women 
on the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Hungary of 26 march 2013, para. 21(g) (Jul. 2, 
2021), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx.
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First, using of the presumption of a lack of consent is justified, first and foremost, 
in terms of the rights of rape victims. this presumption provides them with a higher 
level of protection by dodging societal stereotypes about rape victims (the so-called 
“culture of violence”99). in our view, this social phenomenon developed under 
the influence of two groups of stereotypes, one of which directly relates to sex 
offences and their victims and the other is of a gender nature and affects women 
exclusively.
First of all, the “culture of violence” which influences law enforcement officers 
involves separating all rape cases as well as their victims into “real” and “not real.”100 
the “real” victim, according to sociologists,
resists at a time of showing aggression towards her; she reports rape to 
the police in the shortest possible time; by her appearance, she shows clear 
oppression and depression; she immediately interrupts all contact with her 
rapist, and if she is in a couple with him, she leaves with by all her belongings. 
[She] is also morally impeccable.101
it is also believed that if a victim engages in sexual intercourse without the 
expression of consent, she must resist, which can be proved by signs of violence 
on her body.102
Furthermore, according to some gender stereotypes, a woman should not drink 
much alcohol, so if she did so, a man “has the right” to reasonably believe that she 
therefore expressed consent to sexual intercourse.103 Similarly, a woman who wears 
a short skirt and comes home down a dark deserted alley, a woman who agreed to 
get into a man’s car, or a woman who agreed to go into an apartment with a man 
for a cup of coffee – they all agreed (which follows from their behaviour) to engage 
in sexual intercourse.104
Case-law of the eCtHr dealing specifically with the situations of rapes can 
demonstrate the existence of such stereotypes. in the Aydın v. Turkey case the Court 
pointed out:
99  noémie renard, En finir avec la culture du viol 54 (2018); Le magueresse 2012, at 224; randall 2010, 
at 406.
100  For “real” and “not real” rapes, see the most authoritative work on the subject: Susan estrich, Rape, 
95(6) yale L.J. 1087 (1986).
101  renard 2018, at 54.
102  randall 2010, at 418.
103  Jennifer m. Brown et al., Characteristics Associated with Rape Attrition and the Role Played by Skepticism 
or Legal Rationality by Investigators and Prosecutors, 13(4) Psychol. Crime L. 355, 357 (2007).
104  Id. at 358–359.
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in the view of the Government her decision to marry and her ability to be 
sexually active so soon after her claimed traumatic experience were scarcely 
consistent with the behaviour of a rape victim.105
in M.C. v. Bulgaria, the Strasbourg Court noted:
in particular, no resistance on the applicant’s part or attempts to seek help 
from others had been established.106
in the I.G. v. Moldova case we can find the following passage:
the [national] court concluded that the sexual intercourse had been 
mutually consensual on the basis of the fact that there had been no signs of 
physical violence on the applicant’s body, as confirmed by the forensic expert 
reports.107
in the D.J. v. Croatia case we see:
Legal practice also required resistance from the [rape] victim … in practice 
the victim was often victimised and traumatised in the proceedings, in 
particular through the theory of the so-called “victim’s contribution.” the 
judges often analysed aspects of the victim’s behaviour, such as wearing a short 
skirt, visiting night clubs, hitchhiking and so on, and on the basis of such facts 
applied decreased sentences to the perpetrators.108
Finally, in the decision in the W. v. Slovenia case Strasbourg judges noted:
the verdict was based on the findings that the applicant had not seriously 
resisted sexual intercourse.109
all these passages of the decisions of the eCtHr reveal traces of the “culture of 
violence” in various national jurisdictions, that once again underlines the universality 
of this social phenomenon.
the approach based on the presumption of consent instils a “culture of violence” 
in public opinion. By requiring the involvement of violence, threats and bodily harm, 
105  eCHr, Aydın c. Turkey, 25 September 1997, reports of Judgments and decisions 1997-vi, para. 68.
106  eCHr, M.C. v. Bulgaria, para. 61.
107  eCHr, I.G. v. Moldova, no. 53519/07, 15 may 2012, para. 23.
108  eCHr, D.J. v. Croatia, no. 42418/10, 24 July 2012, paras. 71, 72.
109  eCHr, W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125/06, 23 January 2014, para. 9.
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the criminal law makes it clear that only in this case are the victims of rape “real.” 
otherwise, if the alleged victims do not conform to the set of stereotypes of “a 
culture of violence,” law enforcement officials do not consider themselves obliged 
to carry out a full investigation of the facts reported to them and initiate criminal 
proceedings. the victim is making things up or, at best, exaggerating. this is why the 
literature notes that “No Criming” situations are not something unusual in sex crime 
cases.110 another approach, based on the presumption of a lack of consent without 
requiring proof of vices of the victim’s will, takes into account to a greater extent 
the psychology of victims of sexual violence. they are not always able to resist and 
openly object to have sexual intercourse (not to mention “Stockholm syndrome”).
Secondly, it is clear that the presumption of a lack of consent protects a larger 
range of victims because it does not require mandatory vices of consent of the 
latter. the presence of vices of consent and the lack of consent of the victim are 
not equivalent concepts. For example, if the victim was forced to engage in sexual 
intercourse with a rapist if his or her appearance alone scares him or her, it is unlikely 
that victim’s consent is in any way implied. at the same time, the rapist did not use 
violence or threats thereof de facto, therefore evidence of the coercive nature of 
sexual intercourse will be absent.111 it is no wonder that cases of sexual offences 
are characterised by a lack of sufficient evidence and by scepticism regarding the 
testimony of an alleged rape victim in most domestic legal systems.
at the same time, when the presumption of a lack of consent is used, the vice of 
consent of an alleged rape victim is excluded from the subject-matter of the case. 
this approach significantly reduces the evidence base necessary to prove a crime 
of rape. However, in this case proving consent was obtained must be done by the 
defence to get the charges dismissed. does this situation correspond to the rights 
of accused?
Let’s proceed to consider the shortcomings of the transition to the presumption of 
a lack of consent. Without claiming to be exhaustive we shall list three shortcomings. 
The first one is related to the difficulties and complexities of the evidentiary process 
in the cases of sexual offences. the French Court of Cassation stressed that
in cases of sexual offences, according to the general rule, in the absence of 
witnesses, the testimony of the victim shall be compared with the testimony 
of the accused person.112
110  Brown et al. 2007, at 356.
111  to be fair, it should be noted that, for example, in France, where the presumption of consent is legally 
recognized, sometimes (but extremely rarely) judges agree even in the absence of resistance from the 
victim to establish that the violence has been used. this may indicate attempts to move progressively 
from presumption of consent to presumption of lack thereof (desprez 2012, at 53).
112  Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 4 avril 2007, pourvoi n° 07-80253 (quoted in desprez 2012, 
at 61).
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indeed, sexual offences, being inherently sexual acts, are committed, because 
of the shamefacedness of human nature, mainly in the absence of prying eyes. 
it therefore turns out that the main evidence in these cases is the testimony of 
an alleged victim and the testimony of an accused, which are often diametrically 
opposed. Since the presumption of a lack of consent does not require evidence for 
corroborating the victim’s testimony with other evidence (for example, material 
traces of violence), the judges’ task to assess evidence in cases of sexual offences is 
quite complicated. the situation is also exacerbated by the fact that, according to 
sociological and legal studies, the number of false denunciations in cases of sexual 
offences is higher than in other cases.113
Secondly, regarding the presumption of a lack of consent, the issue of the proper 
form of consent expression is extremely controversial. the legal doctrine of the early 
21st century noted that “it is not always easy for a man to understand that a woman 
does not agree.”114 J. temkin hints at the well-known problem of “female flirtatiousness”: 
“no means yes.”
How should a person express his or her consent to engage in sexual intercourse? 
the answer to this question is not easily to find. one thing is clear. it is not necessary 
to make it weird and demand a dialogue before each sexual act of similar content: 
“– do you agree? – yes, i agree, let’s start.” But if the expression of consent with the 
word “yes” is not required, then there is an even more difficult question: how to 
assess whether the accused person bona fide understood that his partner wishes to 
engage in sexual intercourse with him? in this regard,115 two models of expression of 
consent are distinguished in the theory of communication: behavioural (consent is an 
expressed desire to do something; according to this approach, the accused person’s 
perception of the victim’s desire to engage in sexual intercourse is analysed) and 
communicative (consent is directly expressed through words or actions; according 
to this approach, the accused person’s perception of this kind of words or actions of 
the alleged victim is subject to analysis).116 For example, in Canada, according to the 
Supreme Court position expressed in the R. v. Ewanchuk117 case, a communicative 
way of expressing consent was chosen. it was necessary for the accused to prove 
that he believed that the victim has expressed consent (communicative theory), not 
that he believed the victim has desired intercourse (behavioural theory). in another 
decision, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that
113  Jennifer temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (2002); Brown et al. 2007, at 356.
114  temkin 2002, at 121.
115  Brett 1998.
116  Craig 2009.
117  this case is infamous for the fact that “silent” consent to sexual intercourse was prohibited (Id.).
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the mens rea of sexual assault is not only satisfied when it is shown that 
the accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying “no,” but is also 
satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was 
essentially not saying “yes.”118
that is why “acquiescence” is no longer, in the opinion of the Canadian Supreme 
Court, the consent that necessary in the cases of sexual offences.
one should not ignore the fact that consent in the area of sexual offences is 
understood differently than in any other area of human life. often, in order to prove 
consent, judges take into account the behaviour of victims of sexual violence before 
sexual intercourse (for example, the victim was in favour of the accused person’s acts, 
so-called art of seduction). at the same time, no one will suggest that, for example, 
the consent of a patient to surgery is based only on his behaviour before the medical 
intervention:119 if a person came to the hospital to carry out an examination, this does 
not yet mean that he has expressed his consent to the medical intervention.
the problem of expressing the consent of the victim is complicated by the 
existence of “transitional aspects” and “ambiguous situations”120 when the victim 
agreed to have some actions and not to have others, while keeping silence and taking 
no opposing measures to such actions. For example, a touch to the shoulder entailed 
a kiss, which in turn entailed undoing the blouse... if the alleged victim consented to 
such acts, could the accused person believe bona fide in his or her desire to engage 
in sexual intercourse? or, as in Jessica Jay’s famous song “Casablanca,” “a kiss is still 
a kiss” and nothing else? the Supreme Court of Canada assesses cautiously, on a case-
by-case basis, the entire situation as a whole.
Thirdly and finally, with the transition to the presumption of a lack of consent, 
the issue of the rights of the accused is extremely controversial. the point is that 
technically changing one presumption to another entails the shifting of the burden 
of proof. Switching of the dominant presumption implies for the accused person an 
additional duty: to show that he or she did indeed attempt to obtain the consent 
of the alleged victim and finally received it. How does the shifting of the burden of 
proof by switching the dominant presumption correlate with the meta-presumption 
of criminal proceedings – the presumption of innocence? the Canadian reform 
of 1992, which has been repeatedly mentioned above, and the adoption of the 
law “no means no” were accompanied by the criticism that tightening the rules of 
proof the victim’s consent violates the presumption of innocence of the accused.121 
118  R. v. Park [1995] 2 S.C.r. 836 (Jul. 2, 2021), available at https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/
item/1272/index.do.
119  Brett 1998.
120  Craig 2009; Sheila mcintyre et al., Tracking and Resisting Backlash Against Equality Gains in Sexual 
Offence Law, 20(3) Can. Woman Stud. 72, 77 (2000).
121  mcintyre et al. 2000, at 80.
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this is because it was believed that the alleged victim’s evidence of forced sexual 
intercourse was sufficient to prove the fact of a sexual offence.
if we refer to the eCtHr’s jurisprudence, the jurisdiction of which does not extend 
to Canada but the opinion of which is significant to european countries, its position 
on the matter is: the introduction of evidentiary presumptions must be accompanied 
by various guaranties to protect the presumption of innocence.122 more specifically, 
an exhaustive analysis of the european Court disparate jurisprudence on the impact 
of diverse evidentiary presumptions on the presumption of innocence123 allows one 
to formulate a number of generalising conclusions.124 the first two conclusions are 
formulated in an affirmative form (what the State is enabled to do), while the last two 
conclusions are presented in a negative form (what the State is not enabled to do).
First, the right to the presumption of innocence is not absolute which implies the 
possibility for governments to establish various factual and legal presumptions.125 
Consequently, both the presumption of consent and, more importantly, the 
presumption of a lack of consent do not per se contradict the letter and spirit of the 
eCHr. Second, at the same time, by introducing any presumption, the government 
must maintain a reasonable balance of interests and take into account the importance 
of considering and resolving the case, as well as respect the rights of the defence.126 
it follows that the burden of proof should not be shifted to the defence in such 
a way that it is forced to prove anything.127 Third, the deprivation of the judge’s real 
capacity to assess evidence and thereby the “devastation” of the essence of the 
presumption of innocence is a violation of article 6-2 of the eCHr.128 in cases of 
sexual offences this requirement of judicial capacity to assess evidences is met, 
since among the evidence, there will be at least the testimony of the victim and the 
medical report that the victim actually engaged in sexual intercourse. in this regard, 
122  Ludovic Hennebel & Hélène tigroudja, Traité de droit international des droits de l’Homme 1339 (2016).
123  eCHr, Salabiaku v. France, 7 october 1988, Series a no. 141-a; Pham Hoang v. France, 25 September 
1992, Series a no. 243; Telfner v. Austria, no. 33501/96, 20 march 2001; Radio France and Others v. France, 
no. 53984/00, eCHr 2004-ii; Falk v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 66273/01, eCHr 2004-Xi; Haxhishabani 
v. Luxembourg, no. 52131/07, 20 January 2011; Klouvi v. France, no. 30754/03, 30 June 2011; Iasir v. 
Belgium, no. 21614/12, 26 January 2016.
124  among this practice, eCHr Salabiaku v. France is doctrinally called the “leading case” (Харрис Д., 
О’Бойл, Уорбрик К. Право Европейской конвенции по правам человека [david Harris et al., Law 
of the European Convention on Human Rights] 623 (vasily a. vlasikhin (transl.), anatoly i. Kovler (ed.), 
moscow, 2016).
125  eCHr, Falk v. the Netherlands (dec.).
126  eCHr, Salabiaku v. France, para. 28; Pham Hoang v. France, para. 33; Falk v. the Netherlands (dec.); Radio 
France and Others v. France, para. 24; Haxhishabani v. Luxembourg, para. 38; Klouvi v. France, para. 1; 
Iasir v. Belgium, para. 30; Zschüschen v. Belgium (dec.), para. 22.
127  eCHr, John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, reports of Judgments and decisions 
1996-i, para. 54.
128  eCHr, Salabiaku v. France, para. 28; Klouvi v. France, para. 41.
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the irrefutable presumptions that some national legislators are trying to introduce 
in the field of sexual offenses pose a particular challenge. in France, the authors of 
a number of projects and propositions of laws propose introducing an irrefutable 
lack of consent presumption of minors under the age of 15. do presumptions of this 
kind meet the requirements of the eCtHr? Fourth, the presumption of innocence will 
be considered violated if, without establishing all the circumstances in accordance 
with the procedure prescribed by law, the court renders a decision that reflects 
the culpability of the person.129 in other words, if the court knows in advance 
everything that is reflected in its decision, this situation will constitute a violation 
of the presumption of innocence.
Conclusion
therefore, both the presumption of consent and the presumption of a lack of 
thereof used in cases of sexual offences have advantages and disadvantages. our 
hope is that this essay demonstrates that the shifting from one presumption to 
another should not become a “change of gloves”: this is about human rights, both 
alleged victims of rape and accused persons. it seems that the introduction of the 
presumption of a lack of consent in cases of sexual offences is not per se a violation 
of the right to the presumption of innocence if at the same time:
(a) the application of a lack of consent presumption is not automatic, the judge 
is actually involved in the proof process and not turned into a mechanical decision-
making machine;
(b) the accused is given various means of protecting his or her rights (the eCtHr 
assesses always the proportionality of the introduction of a legal presumption in 
one case or another);
(c) the keeping silence by the accused and his or her refusal to prove the way 
he or she obtained the alleged victim’s consent should not be interpreted as his or 
her plea of guilty, since the imperative obligation of the accused to prove anything 
violates the presumption of innocence.130
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